Customer Reviews
Good History but what is Mr Whiting's Agenda? - By: IstanbulPricey, 04 Jan 2009 
Mr Howells has provided a very detailed synopsis of the battle, so I won't labour that point. I have to say, I was blissfully unaware of this particular battle until I fell on the book here on the Amazon web site. I finally read it & I did find the book quite absorbing. The descriptions of the horrors experienced by the poor bloody infantry (and the tank crews, artillery men, etc) are well-represented. That the battle was largely pointless, leading to casualties numberingin the tens of thousands for the US army (and, indeed for the Germans) to try & take 50 square miles of forest is well made by the author, Charles Whiting (noms de plume: Leo Kessler, Duncan Harding & John Kerrigan, & writer of some 250 books, many of which were novels.) It's a hard read, as chapter after chapter describes further unsuccessful attempts to overrun the German positions - inevitably with the same result - massive casualty numbers for little gain. Huertgen was unarguably a bitterly fought battle.
So, this is an important, but little known, battle, if only to demonstrate that the rush from Brittany to Germany was not without its difficulties & that the Germans fought a hard campaign of attrition on the Allies.
What I had more difficulty with is Mr Whiting's style. It struck me right from the start with his constant references to the commanders (general level) as the 'Top Brass', an expression you don't hear frequently these days. Mr Whiting served during the war (52nd Armoured Reconnaissance Regimentin NW Europe) & I don't know if he had some bad experiences with generals, but he certainly has little time for them. Again, I can live with that - the generals commanding the divisions, corps & armies involvedin the Huertgen did not cover themselvesin glory - but it becomes a constant theme, like a stuck gramophone record grinding away. Additionally, he makes references to what appear to be very private conversations between senior generals (eg Hughes - referred to several timesin the book as a hard-drinking womaniser; once gets the message across - & Eisenhower), but does not give any source - how does he know what was said, or is it largely Whiting's vivid imagination?
There's a degree of cynicism that threads through the book which, for me, detracted from what, otherwise, might be a fair analysis of the campaign. There is the story of black American soldiers being called forward to fight; & the execution of the deserter, PFC Eddie Slovik. These provide useful background, but the constant bitching about the 'Top Brass' gets wearing (only Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne seems worth a damn) - it's like listening to rather dim soldiers & airmen who maintain that 'all officers are rubbish'.
Finally, the book is rounded off, sadly, with a short section linking the attritional campaign of Vietnam to that of the Huertgen & making the point that some of the same officers were involved - Joe Westmoreland who commanded US forcesin 'Nam wasin the Huertgen. It's a dubious leap of logic & does nothing to improve the tone of the book. Like many wars, Vietnam is complex & no reasonable arguments over the nature of the military strategy can be madein a few pages. It does no justice to Mr Whiting's presumable qualities as an author & a historian.
So,in summary, I think the book is worth reading, if you're a student of WWII history - there really is no other book on the subject that I can find (and I would like to.) However, you may wish to be wary of Mr Whiting's cynical tone & his dubious links to other issues; I don't think they are helpful!
Carnage of the Hurtgen - By: David I. Howells, 20 Jun 2007 
This terrible story of the battle of the Hürtgen forest is told by the celebrated military historian Charles Whiting. It's fulcrum centres around a needless battle fought by the US army that led to the wasteful slaughter of over 30,000 US servicemen. This historically neglected battle was later overshadowed by the battle of the Bulge & its 90,000 casualties which took place soon after.
In the autumn & early winter of 1944, the US army was advancing between the Rhur river & Aachen. Instead of bypassing the dense conifered Hurtgen forest & isolating its defenders the US army entered the area to take it from the Germans. In an area broken by few roads, tracks & firebreaks & where vehicular movement was restricted, the GI's advanced against well prepared & stoutly defended German positions. The battle then commenced without the customary overwhelming allied air & armoured superiority.
On the defensive side the small numbers of routes & clearings had allowed German machine-gun, mortar & artillery teams to pre-range their weapons & fire accurately. In this defensive environment relatively small numbers of determined & prepared defenders were highly effective...as the GI's found out to their cost! The German defenders had prepared their defensive positions well with blockhouses, minefields, barbed wire, & booby-traps. There were also a number of bunkersin the area belonging to the deep defences of the Siegfried Line, which were centres of stiff & determined resistance. The dense forest also allowed infiltration & flanking movements by both sides & it was sometimes difficult to establish a front line or to be confident that an area had been cleared of the enemy. This led to a regular climate of sudden attacks & counter attacks by both sides.
As the American divisions started to take unexpectedly massive casualties, battle commanders had to put into the field inexperienced recruits as replacements. This was a cannon fodder approach to take a well defended battlefield when the pride & reputation of the US army had put on the line to take this coniferred valueless objective. The casualties continued to escalate dramatically when an easy disengagement would have been the most sensible option.
The Germans were hampered by much of the same difficulties but the German defenders had the advantage that their commanders & many of their soldiers had been fighting for a few years & had learned the necessary tactics for fighting efficientlyin winter & forest. So with a determined foe set against them the ensuing battle was a cycle of horrid carnage where American units were literally wiped out. The fighting was bitter, ferocious & unrelentingin the most testing of weather conditions. The battle was eventually won only by the insertion of huge troop numbers by the Americans.
The book is very descriptive of the fighting, artillery bombardments & atrocious weather conditions, often repetitively so. The fortitude & bravery of the American GI's glistens on every page but so does the often highlighted instances of 'self preservation' & desperate self inflicted wounds. This only brings to the fore the obviously desperate horror of the forest fighting. Overall a story of military folly on what has to be one of the US army's biggest strategic & casualty costly blunders. A blunder that is not highly advertised!
An enjoyable & interesting read on one of histories least notable battles.
Brilliant - By: , 10 Feb 2004 
Charles Whiting has written a history of a battle that is both measuredin its analysis of events (behind the scenes as well as on the battlefield) & harrowingly visceralin its depiction of the horrors experienced by the soldiers. It is an essential account of a largely pointless bloodbath.
