Customer Reviews
A key essay, which provides for a new interpretation of the conflicts under way - By: Dottori Germano, 12 Nov 2008 
The Descent into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid is going to alter the common view about what happenedin Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Central Asia after 9/11. It should be considered as a seminal work, for sure, because it challenges the current official version about the guidelines followedin the international reconstruction effort under wayin Afghanistan. The most troubling assumption of the essay relates to the support accorded by the US to the warlords, which alienated,in Rashid's view, the Afghan people & opened a window of opportunity for the Taliban to come back. In Rashid opinion, since the very beginnig of his endeavour Karzai lacked adequate support by the US, because the Pentagon disregarded nation building, & wanted to avoid a larger military involvement on the field. The official story still mantains right the opposite. The Descent is telling troubling truths also about Pakistan & the real committment showed by former President Musharraf to the Global War on Terror, exposing all the setbacks suffered by the regional US policy. Rashid is very critical as well on the Bush administration stance about human rights, whichin the end proved to be highly counterproductive for the US long term interestsin Central Asia. Guantanamo & the renditions are strongly criticized. Finally, the book is richin first hand infos. It is clearly a must read, also because Rashid has been called to give the US Strategic Review of the Afghan Strategy his own advice.
An excellent overview of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan. - By: Orangutan, 27 Sep 2008 I've really enjoyed this wide ranging & very readable book. It is an excellent introduction to the complexities of Western involvementin Afghanistan, to the failures of policyin Pakistan & to the tactics employed by the CIA under the "war on terror" umbrella. This is an indispensable book for anyone interestedin current day politics, because decisions & events which are played outin this region have a tremendous influence on Western governance. It deserves to be on the bookshelf of every NATO officer & NATO government MP.
Insane warmongering - By: William Podmore, 25 Sep 2008 
Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid is a friend & supporter of Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai. Rashid warns that Afghanistan is facing state collapse, Pakistan isin meltdown, & the five Central Asian states are dictatorships. He claims that the most important thingin the world is to rebuild these nations.
He shows that President Karzai's regime depends on warlords & drug barons, who are backed by the CIA. Britain's forces there are supposed to be helping to cut opium production, but their policy of paying farmers to destroy their opium crops has been `disastrous'. Opium production soared from 4,000 tonsin 2005 to 8,200in 2007. Half of this was grownin British-occupied Helmand, where the rest of Afghanistan's opium was sold.
The USA is allied to Pakistan & Saudi Arabia, which are al-Qaeda's main sponsors. The USA has given more than $10 billion to Pakistan's President Musharraf. Bush backed him even after he tore up the constitution, sacked the judges, imprisoned more than 12,000 people & muzzled the media. This `created immense hatred for the U.S. Army & America'.
The USA's torture of POWs has further increased this hatred. As Rashid writes, "By following America's leadin promoting or condoning disappearances, torture, & secret jails, these countries found their path to democracy & their struggle against Islamic extremism set back by decades. Western-led nation building had little credibility if it denied justice to the very people it was supposed to help. It could well be argued that over time Islamic extremists were emboldened rather than subdued by the travesty of justice the United States perpetrated. The people learned to hate America. ... The deterioration of human rightsin each country became linked to that government's proximity to the CIA."
So the USA's wars have increased the al-Qaeda threat, particularlyin Pakistan. Rashid also notes that US interventions have failedin Yugoslavia & East Timor & made a hell-hole of Iraq.
And then - after all this - Rashid calls on the USA, not to get out of the region, but to get deeper in. More sanely, he also calls on the peoples of the region to take responsibility for moving their nations towards democracy.
A deeply troubling book - By: Ralph Blumenau, 11 Jul 2008 Ahmed Rashid has long been a leading expert on Afghanistan, Pakistan, & the Muslim states of Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union. In 2000, the year before 9/11, he published 'Taliban', a book which politicians rushed to read after the attack on the Twin Towers; & if Central Asia catches fire, they will doubtlessly rush to his following book, 'Jihad', first publishedin 2002, which is an equally authoritative account of the dangers lurkingin that area.
After a brilliant introduction of 21 pages, the first three chapters of the present book give the story of American involvementin Afghanistan before 9/11. The characteristic unreliability of American policy is brought out: help given to the Islamic forces & to Pakistan while the Soviets werein Afghanistan; then a total lack of interestin the period after the Soviet withdrawalin 1989, when Afghanistan was first torn apart by competing war-lords & was then overrun by the Taliban.
No longerin need of Pakistan, the USA then imposed sanctions on that country because it, like India, had carried out tests of nuclear weapons.
The next 15 chapters are essentially a sequel to the author's Taliban, & chroniclesin great & sometimesin dense detail, right up to early 2008, the story of Afghanistan & Pakistan after the expulsion of the Taliban at the end of 2001 & the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim President. The victory had been not only been swift (it took two months), but had also been cheap for the Americans. They had fought the campaign from the air, leaving the land fighting to the war-lords of the Northern Alliance. The Americans lost just one man killed. Karzai was installed as interim president. This easy victory led the Americans to believe that it could be copiedin Iraq, an attack on which the neo-cons had planned even before the Afghan war. Once the Iraq war began, the Americans concentrated on that & paid much less attention to Afghanistan, on which they wanted to spend as little money as possible. Rumsfeld was explicitly not interestedin `nation building': helping Afghanistan to develop a healthy infrastructure.
From this all sorts of mistakes arose:
1. It seemed easier to use the armies of the war-lords than to build & train an Afghan National Army.
2. Karzai, a Pashtun, had no control over the Tajik & Uzbek war-lords. They refused to disarm or to let their men be integrated into a national army. Occasionally they fought each other; they collected tolls which they refused to hand over to the government; & they alienated the Pashtun majority. For a long time Karzai dared not confront them. When eventually he managed to form a new government without themin 2004, he proved indecisivein implementing a programme of reform.
3. He was unwilling to stamp out the cultivation of opium & the drug-lords, one of whom was his own brother. Drug dealing corrupted the entire administration & the police. The Allies did not provide money for planting alternative crops & would not allow their armies to interdict the drug trade for fear of alienating the tens of thousands of farmers who depended on it.
4. The worst problem is Pakistan. Osama bin Laden & the Al-Queda forces, as well as the fleeing Taliban found sanctuaryin the tribal areas of Pakistan. These were already home to what would become the Pakistani Taliban, who helped them to rebuild their forces & joined themin incursions back into Afghanistan.
For a long time the Americans were not interestedin the Taliban & did not take it seriously; but they did want Al-Qaeda people handed over, & for this they needed Musharraf's help. Musharraf did this (if he could find them!), &in return sanctions on Pakistan were lifted. For a long time the Americans did not realize the close connections that had been built up between Al-Qaeda & the Taliban. But Musharraf, the Pakistani Army & the ISI (the intelligence service) protected the Taliban & gave it much covert help & even direction. This was largely because they saw Karzai as a potential ally of India. Karzai pleaded with the Americans & the British to pressurize Pakistan to give up supporting the Taliban; but these found the alliance with Pakistan too important, & pretended to believe Musharraf's denials, aided, as these were, by the ISI very occasionally giving them information about the whereabouts of Taliban leaders.
But while this was just enough to appease the Allies, it was also enough to enrage the more extreme sections of the Taliban, whoin any case were egged on by their al-Qaeda allies to attack Musharraf & his police as American lackeys. Musharraf emerges from this book as being as devious as he is foolish.
5. When the Americans focussed on Iraq, NATO took over as the Western instrumentin Afghanistan. But each of the 37 countries which provided troops drew up its own rules about what these troops could - or more importantly: could not - do. Some confined them to reconstruction & humanitarian work; some were specifically prohibited for fighting the Taliban; some were not to interfere with poppy growing; those stationedin the more peaceful north were prevented from helping the hard-pressed - & always insufficiently numerous - troopsin the south. Of the 45,000 troops stationedin Afghanistanin 2006, only 15,000 were available for fighting. In the absence of a unified command, it is not surprising that the Taliban began to reestablish itselfin large areas of the East & South from 2003 onwards & have been gainingin strength ever since.
There is much morein this troubling book - for example a comparatively brief account of the danger of al-Qaeda & other Islamic organizations establishing themselvesin the Uzbekistan & the other secular Central Asian republics, where tyrannical & corrupt governments are propped up by the Americans simply because these, too, suppress Islamic (along with all other) groups.
Excellent and very readable - By: Someone, 10 Jul 2008 This is a fascinating book. I read a proof copy which I foundin a charity shop & will now buy the final edition.
The author is clearly very knowledgeable on all aspects of the recent history of Afghanistan. He writes extremely lucidly & engagingly without ever appearing condescending to the reader.
Complaints - few or none.
Maybe the only thing that could be said is that the author has moved from being an observer (compare e.g. his Taleban book) to being now a (minor) participantin his role as an advisor to the UN. There are now clearly a few axes to grind. This colours the book occasionally & should be bornin mind.
